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 In Defence of Local Identity 
Cultural Factors and Actors’ Strategy  
During Regionalization in Romania 
 
DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN, SABINA-ADINA LUCA, 
BOGDAN GHEORGHIȚĂ 
 
 
 
As one can frequently notice, regionalization is never free of political 
strategies. When asked to complete such a complex process, politicians and 
parties generally take into account electoral issues and look for political 
advantages. Changing the regional structure means also bringing changes in the 
political distribution and in the electoral competition at local and regional level. 
But parties and governments also face another type of challenges when it comes 
to put in place complex regionalization processes. This is the resistance of local 
structures. The resistance can be driven by political and economic reasons, of 
course, but also by another factor, namely the defence of local identity. As 
regionalization involves defining a new administrative layer and sharing 
competences, it requires a territorial dimension which is always subject to 
contestation. 
The aim of the article is to focus on the territorial dimension of 
regionalization and to emphasize the importance of competing political 
geographies. How to draw the regional units and how to regroup existing 
smaller units into bigger units is never free of contestation from local structures 
and actors. This contestation is an essential factor in the bottom-up processes of 
decentralization, but it very often works as an inhibitory factor when contesting 
top-down decisions. This is visible in Romania, which inherited a long lasting 
tradition of administrative centralization, and largely imitated the centralization 
efforts of the French republic and thus has been confronted with the cultural 
homogenization of the national territory, following its independence in 18771. 
In the same time, Romania is a EU member state, subject to political influence 
of the EU regional policies and other European regionalization models. Even 
one cannot clearly identify a EU conditionality pushing towards regionalization, 
recent Romanian tendencies for stronger regionalization are in connexion with 
governmental interests for boosting spending the EU cohesion funds. Therefore, 
                                                 
1
  K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. 
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the more general East European context of regionalization and its complex 
pattern of diffusion is taken into account. 
The article intends to weight the comparative importance of the competing 
geographies for the advance of the current regionalization process in Romania, 
which is somehow different from the French case, since the regionalization 
seems to be seriously hampered by the indecision of successive governments, 
who did not take the electoral risk to favour a given map against other 
competing maps and postponed regionalization for almost two decades2. From 
this perspective, regionalization is mainly understood here as a political 
geographical process of reshaping inner borders, as an effort to redesign 
regional units. A separate discussion has to be introduced on the substance of 
regionalization, with a special emphasis on changing competences for the newly 
created regional units. In Romania, the incipient debate focused rather on the 
geographical aspect, turning the more complicated and abstract aspect of 
decentralization as a second step and a secondary issue. The political deadlock 
regarding reshaping the regional units led to postponing regionalization and 
gave no real chance to a serious debate regarding future competences for sub-
national units. The reasons for postponing effective regionalization in Romania 
are multi-fold3. Governments found themselves in an uncomfortable situation 
every time they tried to push forward the regionalization process, facing 
administrative, European, electoral and ethnic types of conditionality. In the 
most recent phase of regionalization, after the 2012 general elections which 
provided the government with a strong parliamentary majority, the government 
faced a problem never seriously taken into account during the early stages of 
regionalization, which is the defence of local identity by local actors who 
disputed the drawing of the new regional maps. The electoral costs deriving 
from the contestation, alongside other coalition problems occurring in 2013, 
made the government to postpone regionalization once again. 
The present analysis of the Romanian case sheds new light on the complex 
process of redesigning and rescaling regional government in countries with a 
certain centralization tradition. It shows that even the highly centralized states 
have to take somehow into account local identities and contestations that arise, 
at least by altering the political-administrative decision, if not by postponing it 
in favour of a long lasting status-quo. In this inquiry, Romania exemplifies the 
decisive influence of the French administrative model and highlights its 
strengths and weaknesses when facing sensitive local identity issues. Moreover, 
the article opens a new perspective on the regionalization process analysis in 
                                                 
2
  D. Dragoman, B. Gheorghiță, “Regional Design, Local Autonomy and Ethnic 
Struggle: Romania's Syncopated Regionalization”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 68, no. 2, 
2016, pp. 270-290. 
3
  Idem, “European Conditionality, Ethnic Control or Electoral Disarray? The 2011 Controversial 
Territorial Reform Attempt in Romania”, Polis, vol. 2, no. 1, 2013, pp. 72-93. 
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Romania by proposing a model of actors’ interaction between local ground and 
central government level. This model might help understand the forthcoming 
regionalization renewed effort in 2017, following the fall 2016 parliamentary 
elections. 
 
 
Decentralization in a Highly Centralized State 
 
The development and consolidation of local governments is today a 
common feature not only in Western democracies4, but in developing countries 
as well. Especially nowadays, in the context of globalization that affects 
developing countries5, local identities are at the heart of political 
transformations6. Those countries have to take into account decentralization and 
even regionalization when it comes to tackle important issues as the 
performance of local government, strategic planning, economic development 
and the relations with the European Union (top-down factors), as well as 
regional mobilization, democratization and the involvement of regional elites 
(bottom-up factors) that finally transform government in governance7. 
Additionally, there are a series of conditions influencing local and regional 
governments, which pertain to the unification of the national territory and the 
consolidation of a central government, making them capable of insuring the 
territorial national unity. In this respect, Romania largely used the French 
centralized model of territorial control and governance8. For decades, this was 
the model used by Romanian national elites in order to integrate provinces once 
belonging to regional empires (Turkish, Austrian and Russian) into a unitary 
state9. It will take almost a century and the favourable political context of the 
European integration for Romania to adopt a more flexible regional design. 
Although France moved away from the tough centralist regime in the 
1980s, Romania did not follow. In France, decentralization was made in brutal 
and comprehensive manner10 for several reasons, but mainly for breaking the 
cycle of the welfare state mentality, to boost the industrial and urban 
development and revitalize the periphery in political, administrative and 
                                                 
4
  P. John, Local Governance in Western Europe, Sage, London, 2001. 
5
  J. Harris, K. Stokke, O. Tornquist, (eds.), Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics 
of Democratisation, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005. 
6
  L. Pratchett, “Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the ‘New Localism’”, Political 
Studies, vol. 52, no. 2, 2004, pp. 358-375. 
7
  P. John, Local Governance…cit., p. 123. 
8
  L. Boia, Romania: Borderland of Europe, Reaktion Books, London, 2001. 
9
  I. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and 
Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, New York, 1995. 
10
  J.C. Thoenig, “Territorial Administration and Political Control. Decentralization in 
France”, Public Administration, vol. 83, no. 3, 2005, pp. 685-708. 
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economic terms11. Despite the French example, Romania favoured the previous 
French centralist model because this model was better suited to Romania’s 
nation and state-building efforts. Modern Romania was created in 1918 by 
binding together provinces inhabited in large numbers by ethnic Romanians. 
Those provinces were previously part of multi-national empires which 
dominated the region for centuries. When Transylvania and Banat finally 
separated from Austria-Hungary in December 1918 on the basis of the self-
determination legitimate principle12, a long process of state-building was in fact 
coming to an end. Before that, Wallachia and Moldova declared their 
independence from the Ottoman empire in 1877 and formed the Kingdom of 
Romania, alongside Dobruja, ceded by Russia in 1878 following the peace 
Treaty of San Stefano in exchange of territories in Southern Bessarabia. Early 
on in 1918, Bessarabia and Bucovina separated from the Russian empire and 
from Austria-Hungary, respectively13. When state-building was over, nation-
building become the pivotal process that accompanied social and economic 
modernization. The new provinces brought in not only many ethnic Romanians 
once separated by the borders of the previous multinational empires, but large 
ethnic and religious minorities, with more urbanized, educated and active 
cultural elites14. The aim of Romanian national elites would be for decades the 
consolidation of the inchoate national state by homogenizing the political space, 
unifying the national culture and defining citizenship15. This task even 
combined with building state socialism16, which turned late communism in 
Romania into a ethno-nationalist, patrimonial and sultanistic regime17, despite 
the initial promise for the perfect equality between workers and peasants, with 
no reference to their ethnic background18. 
The question of regional autonomy for ethnic Hungarians is since then at 
the heart of the regionalization process in Romania. Throughout the 20th 
                                                 
11
  N. Vlahos, “The Politics of Subnational Decentralization in France, Brazil, and Italy”, 
Journal of Public Deliberation, vol. 9, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1-27. 
12
  K. Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA, 1969. 
13
  K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, cit. 
14
  I. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania…cit. 
15
  D. Dragoman, “National Identity and Europeanization in Post-Communist Romania. The 
Meaning of Citizenship in Sibiu: European Capital of Culture 2007”, Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 2008, pp. 63-78. 
16
  K. Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of 
Romania, 1944-1965, University of California Press, Berkeley CA, 1971. 
17
  J.J. Linz, A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore MD, 1996. 
18
  C. Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis of the Leninist Legacy”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 2, 
2003, pp. 166-201. 
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century, tensions between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in 
Transylvania have been based on perpetual and parallel fears for secession, on 
the one side, for slow and painful assimilation on the other side19. Despite the 
trauma of World War II and the temporary annexation of a large part of 
Transylvania by the fascist Hungarian government (1940-1945)20 and despite 
the legacy of the Romanian overtly nationalist communist regime under the rule 
of Nicolae Ceaușescu (1974-1989)21, ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians 
in Transylvania managed after 1989 to set up a peaceful cohabitation 
accompanied by a gradual improvement of minority rights22. Regarding 
administrative issues, the post-communist status-quo is based on the acceptance 
of minority linguistic rights23, on the one hand, and the conservation of the 
framework of the centralist system and limited local autonomy, on the other 
hand. The status-quo and the weak incentives for overpassing the deadlock 
played an essential role during regionalization, from the first steps in the 1990s 
to the more serious negotiations in 2011, which finally ended with the same 
status-quo in place24. 
Turning back to regional units, the current design originates in the 
communist project of unifying national territory, which was expressed by 
reshaping the territorial administration in 1968. On the one hand, the communist 
project was aimed at limiting the regional economic development gap it 
inherited from pre-communist times25. It is worth underlining that, back in 
1918, the new provinces brought in not only important national minorities, but 
                                                 
19
  E. Illyés, National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania, East European 
Monographs, Boulder CO, 1982; L. Boia, Cum s-a românizat România, Humanitas, 
București, 2015. 
20
  The partition of Transylvania was made in 1940 by Nazi Germany as a compromise for 
the territorial quarrel between fascist Romania and fascist Hungary, which were Hitler’s 
allies at the time. See also D. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his 
Regime, 1940-1944, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006. 
21
  K. Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceaușescu’s Romania, California University Press, Berkeley CA, 1995. 
22
  M. Robotin, L. Salat, (eds.), A New Balance: Democracy and Minorities in Post-
Communist Europe, LGI Books, Budapest, 2003; D. Dragoman, “Ethnic Relations in 
Mixed Communities: Why the Context is Important for the Way Romanians Interact with 
Minorities after 1989”, Südosteuropa – Journal of Politics and Society, vol. 63, no. 1, 
2015, pp. 136-156. 
23
  M. Călușer, Carta europeană a limbilor regionale sau minoritare în România. Între 
norme și practici, Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center Press, Cluj-Napoca, 
2009; D. Dragoman, “Linguistic Pluralism and Citizenship in Romania”, in D. Richter, I. 
Richter, I. Ulasiuk, R. Toivanen, (eds.), Language Rights Revisited, Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2012, pp. 267-280. 
24
  D. Dragoman, B. Gheorghiță, “Regional Design, Local Autonomy and Ethnic 
Struggle…cit.”. 
25
  D. Chirot, (ed.), The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe, California University 
Press, Berkeley CA, 1989. 
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regions with different development levels. Not only Transylvania was more 
ethnically heterogeneous, but it was more industrialized and urbanized, 
contrasting with more rural and agrarian Romania. Therefore, economic 
homogenization through rough industrialization and forced urbanization 
accompanied territorial design during communist times. On the other hand, the 
1968 design was putting an end to a previous limited regional autonomy 
enjoyed by ethnic Hungarians under the umbrella of an autonomous region in 
Transylvania. This region was created after 1948 by the communist regime 
itself, in order to emphasize the unity of Romanian and Hungarian workers and 
peasants, equally engaged in building state socialism. 
Despite numerous and profound changes brought by post-communism in 
political, social and economic areas, the regional design remained untouched 
after 1989. The current settings still display social economic disparities, despite 
the state efforts made during the communist rule. The United Nations 
Development Programme in Romania (UNDP) issued several reports on human 
development, noticing the existing regional gaps. In spite of recent important 
rates of economic growth and performance, the economic development has not 
activated faster and more equitable human development progress26. Moreover, 
economic growth has not been even across and within regions27, with different 
potential and forecast performance for the future. With regard to future 
development of the regions, UNDP divides counties in four categories. First, 
those which are located in Transylvania (development regions Center and West) 
and Bucharest, the capital city, and which seem to have better opportunities for 
expanding economic and human development, defined by large and urban 
localities, dynamic economic conditions and diverse production structures, low 
unemployment rates and better chances to generate their own resources. Second, 
counties from regions with great potential, but with limited growth, as it is the 
case with development region North West in Transylvania and region South-
East in Wallachia and Dobruja. These are large urban counties where economic 
growth has occurred, but at slower rates and on a smaller scale, yet they are 
average in terms of unemployment rates and development indicators. Third, 
counties from region South in Wallachia, defined by greater disparities, with 
growing or unstable unemployment rates, low productivity, decreasing levels of 
life expectancy and lower educational achievement. Finally, the fourth category, 
counties from region South-West in Wallachia and especially region North-East 
in Moldova, counties with contracting opportunities and little growth, higher 
levels of unemployment, low human development indicators and widening 
                                                 
26
  UNDP Romania, National Human Development Report 2003-2005 for Romania, UNDP, 
București, 2005; UNDP Romania, National Human Development Report – Romania, 
2007, UNDP, București, 2007. 
27
  European Commission, Growing Regions, Growing Europe: Fourth Report on Economic 
and Social Cohesion, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 2007. 
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disparities regarding educational attainment28. The development perspective 
may explain, therefore, the conflict of actors when it comes to set up the 
composition of future regions, as well as their capital-cities. The picture of regional 
development disparities combine with ethnic-based issues in the argumentation 
of those actors, making regionalization in Romania a difficult process. 
 
 
Regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe 
and EU Conditionality 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, regionalization could have been perceived 
as one of the areas where the European Union conditionality be highly salient. 
As noticed by researchers, the scope of EU conditionality is far larger for the 
East European countries than for their Mediterranean predecessors29. During 
negotiations, candidate countries had to harmonize legislation with EU 
standards, namely with a vast range of rules, regulations and agreements 
concerning numerous policy domains. The necessity to implement the bulk of 
standards, known as the acquis communautaire, could have suggested at the 
very beginning that public administration would fall within the scope of EU 
conditionality. Noticing the unprecedented power asymmetries between the EU 
and East Central European countries through the acquis communautaire, it was 
expected that regional governance reform would fit into a broader process of 
Europeanization30. The different trajectories and outcomes of the reform in 
different countries from the region may suggest that EU conditionality is more 
elastic as previously thought31, especially when external incentives compete 
with internal constraints. From this perspective, Romania is a good example for 
the limits of EU conditionality. Without denying conditionality, the visible 
limits of external constraints demonstrate the fluid nature of conditionality and 
the weakness of a clear-cut causal relationship between conditionality and 
outcome it this particular area32. 
                                                 
28
  UNDP Romania, National Human Development Report 2003-2005 for Romania, cit., p. 71. 
29
  A. Grzymala-Busse, A. Innes, “Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political 
Competition in East Central Europe”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 1, 
2003, pp. 64-73. 
30
  C. O’Dwyer, “Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe: Europeanization 
or Domestic Politics as Usual?”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, no. 2, 
2006, pp. 219-253. 
31
  M. Czernialewska, C.J. Paraskevopoulos, J. Szlachta, “The Regionalization Process in Poland: 
An Example of ‘Shallow’ Europeanization?”, Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 
2004, pp. 461-495. 
32
  J. Hughes, G. Sasse, C. Gordon, “Conditionality and Compliance in the EUs Eastward 
Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2004, pp. 523-551. 
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With the EU accession in mind, and focusing on the EU regional policy 
benefits, or simply trying to adapt regional institutions to increasing competition 
on the consolidating market, several countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
decided to redesign regional administration. Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia managed to achieve regional reforms33. In accordance to the EU 
conditionality perspective34, they also largely benefited from the EU structural 
funds, distributed through regional policies by the regions themselves. Those 
countries have responded to the EU demands for changes in order to 
implementing the EU regional policy, namely mechanisms for inter-ministerial 
communication, capacity for monitoring and implementing policy, adoption of a 
national development plan, the adoption of the European territorial statistical 
system (NUTS), but also for the clear involvement of regional-level actors in 
making regional policy35. 
Despite the clear-cut causal relationship between direct EU conditionality 
and outcome in the process of regionalization, an effect of the administrative 
and economic performance of Central European countries, due to regional 
reshape, on Romanian regional compliance is to be taken into account. In these 
terms, one can even speak about a regionalization diffusion process, with 
Romania witnessing the effect of more successful regional policies. In fact, one 
can point out the use of the EU severe conditionality argument in Romania 
during the regionalization debate in 2011. Then the Democrat-Liberal party on 
government tried to persuade both its governing coalition partner (the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians) and parties from the opposition that 
regionalization is inevitable under EU constraint and should be done quickly, in 
order to maximize EU membership and direct structural funding36. However, 
coalition bargaining ended in failure, as underlined below, leaving in place a 
long lasting status-quo on the matter of regionalization. 
 
 
Romanian Regionalization in Slow-Motion 
 
Regionalization in Romania is a very slow process. Moreover, its trajectory 
is far from being linear. Depending of pressing factors, regionalization can 
                                                 
33
  M. Ferry, “From Government to Governance: Polish Regional Development Agencies in 
a Changing Regional Context”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 3, 2007, 
pp. 447-474. 
34
  M. Brusis, “The Instrumental Use of European Union Conditionality: Regionalization in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 19, no. 2, 
2005, pp. 291-316. 
35
  C. O’Dwyer, “Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe…cit.”, p. 227. 
36
  D. Dragoman, B. Gheorghiță, “Regional Design, Local Autonomy and Ethnic 
Struggle…cit.”. 
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boost for a short period of time only to rest for many long years before 
favourable factors work again. Those factors range from political indecision due 
to outcome uncertainty and electoral issues37, to ethnic factors pertaining to the 
autonomy status of regions inhabited by large ethnic minorities as the 
Hungarians living in Transylvania38. 
The regionalization process began in 1997, with the new regions 
designed mainly for complying to the European Union basic requirements in the 
perspective of future EU accession negotiations, but with no real willingness to 
empower the new regional units39. Unlike other former communist states in the 
region, as Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia, which endowed new regions 
with varying competences40, Romania limited regionalization to territorial 
statistical reporting and monitoring. Since 1997, regions in Romania are not 
legal persons, but merely statistical regrouping of existing counties. One of the 
main reasons for this is that the Constitution in place acknowledges the county 
as the largest regional unit. The incipient regionalization was not conceived as a 
process of decentralization, with the perspective of full autonomy of the new 
regions. It was rather a development tool, used by the government as 
preparation for the future EU financial structural aid and as a compliance with 
the European territorial statistical system (NUTS). This represents a clear 
government strategy of creating functional regional structures for administrative 
and statistical purposes, without devolving real competences to the newly 
created regional entities41. The new development regions are since then run by 
Regional Development Councils and Agencies, under the general coordination 
of a National Council for Regional Development and of a specialized Ministry 
for Regional Development and European integration. Agencies and the 
subsequent regional policies they coordinate at regional level are financed by a 
                                                 
37
  A.M. Dobre, “The Dynamics of Partisan Adaptation to Europeanization: The Romanian 
Case of Regionalization”, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political 
Research Joint Session of Workshops, Granada, Spain, 14-19 April 2005; D. Dragoman, 
“Regional Inequalities, Decentralization and the Performance of Local Governments in 
Post-Communist Romania”, Local Government Studies, vol. 37, no. 6, 2011, pp. 647-669; 
A. Zamfira, “Methodological Limitations in Studying the Effect of (Inter)ethnicity on 
Voting Behaviour, with Examples from Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia”, Erdkunde, 
vol. 69, no. 2, 2015, pp. 161-173; D. Alexandru, “Decentralization and Territorial 
Development in Romania. Trends and Challenges”, Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-
Government, vol. 14, no. 3, 2016, pp. 475-494. 
38
  D. Dragoman, B. Gheorghiță, “Regional Design, Local Autonomy and Ethnic 
Struggle…cit.”. 
39
  D. Dragoman, ”Regional Inequalities, Decentralization…cit.”. 
40
  C. O’Dwyer, “Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe…cit.”; J.A. Yoder, 
“Leading the Way to Regionalization in Post-Communist Europe: An Examination of the 
Process and Outcomes of Regional Reform in Poland”, East European Politics and 
Societies, vol. 21, no. 3, 2007, pp. 424-446. 
41
  A.M. Dobre, “The Dynamics of Partisan Adaptation to Europeanization…cit.”. 
340 DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN, SABINA-ADINA LUCA, BOGDAN GHEORGHIȚĂ 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 3  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional Development Fund, fuelled mainly by the national budget and the EU 
financial contribution. Agencies are not legal persons, but non-profit and non-
governmental organizations which project, implement and overview 
development policies at regional level. In this respect, Romanian regionalization 
is closer to the Turkish mechanism of development based on regional 
development agencies42 than to the Polish shift towards regional governance43. 
 
Table 1 
The County Composition of Development Regions 
 
The regrouping of the counties made back in 1997 was made by using 
several criteria, mainly the potential for cooperation between counties and the 
variation in development indices at that moment. The purpose for regrouping 
the counties into larger development regions was to create a potential for 
development by including central and peripheral sub-regions. Thus each 
peripheral sub-region, which display human development indices below the 
national average, could benefit of the positive influence of central regions. They 
                                                 
42
  A. Lagendijk, S. Kayasu, S. Yasar, “The Role of Regional Development Agencies in 
Turkey. From Implementing EU Directives to Supporting Regional Business 
Communities?”, European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, 2009, pp. 383-396. 
43
  M. Ferry, “From Government to Governance…cit.”. 
Regions Counties 
Region 1, North-East Bacău (BC), Botoşani (BT), Neamţ (NT), Iaşi (IS), Suceava 
(SV), Vaslui (VS) 
Region 2, South-East Brăila (BR), Buzău (BZ), Constanţa (CT), Galaţi (GL), Tulcea 
(TL), Vrancea (VN) 
Region 3, South Argeş (AG), Călăraşi (CL), Dâmboviţa (DB), Giurgiu (GR), 
Ialomiţa (IL), Prahova (PH), Teleorman (TR) 
Region 4, South-West Dolj (DJ), Gorj (GJ), Mehedinţi (MH), Olt (OT), Vâlcea (VL) 
Region 5, West Arad (AR), Caraş-Severin (CS), Hunedoara (HD), Timiş 
(TM) 
Region 6, North-West Bihor (BH), Bistriţa-Năsăud (BN), Cluj (CJ), Maramureş 
(MM), Satu-Mare (SM), Sălaj (SJ) 
Region 7, Center Alba (AB), Braşov (BV), Covasna (CV), Harghita (HR), 
Mureş (MS), Sibiu (SB) 
Region 8, Bucharest-Ilfov Bucharest (B), Ilfov (IF) 
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might therefore be considered as a priority area for future intervention and a 
target for future development actions44. The regrouping used additional 
geographical and historical criteria. An important limitation in drawing the new 
development regions was that they do not overpass the borders of historical 
regions, wherever it was possible. The limitation was overruled only in the 
creation of Region 2 (South-East), where regrouping counties put together parts 
of former historical regions Moldova (VN, TL), Wallachia (BR, BZ) and 
Dobruja (CT, TL) and in the shaping of Region 5 (West), where southern parts 
of the former Principality of Transylvania (HD) have been mixed with the 
whole former historical region of Banat (TM, AR, CS). The limitation to not 
trespass historical regional borders has to be seen as an effort to respect historical 
differences and specificities, after decades of harsh territorial and cultural 
homogenization put in place by the late communist regime, which spared no 
effort in building a single and unified socialist nation of workers and peasants. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Development Regions in Romania45 
 
                                                 
44
  T. Hansen, I. Ianoş, G. Pascariu, V. Platon, D. Sandu, Profiles of the Romanian 
Development Regions, Ramboll Consultancy Group, București, 1997. 
45
  Map available at http://www.oirposdru-vest.ro, accessed 12 July 2016. 
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Combined with the cooperation potential criterion, the regionalization 
gave birth to geographical units that worked for more than a decade as statistical 
units. The lack of institutional performance of the existing counties and the 
incapacity of Romania to attract and spend the EU development funds, 
combined with other political internal issues, made the central government once 
again in 2012-2013 to restart the process of regionalization by proposing a 
division of the eight current development regions into smaller units. 
 
 
How to Redraw Regional Units?  
Local Actors, Local Identities and Interests 
 
Despite the fact that development regions never worked as regional units 
and the EU funding was mainly spent by various ministry mechanisms of 
redistribution from the central government directly to local authorities, bureaus 
of Regional Development Agencies have been established in cities from the 
seven regions as headquarters for future regional authorities. Because those 
cities are the capital-cities of various counties (Piatra Neamț – NT for Region 1, 
Brăila – BR for Region 2, Călărași – CL for Region 3, Craiova – DJ for Region 
4, Timișoara – TM for Region 5, Cluj-Napoca, Alba-Iulia – AB for Region 7, 
and Bucharest for Region 8), they become the capitals of development regions. 
Since the regionalization was made in 1997 on the basis of a pure central 
government decision, redrawing regional units in 2012-2013 meant regrouping 
counties, or negotiating new capital-cities for those regional units. With future 
consistent competences for development regions, setting up the location for 
regional capitals could be an economic incentive for future investment. The 
actors most active in disputing capitals for regions were the authorities from 
most similar counties, in terms of economic and cultural profiles, which put 
forward a large array of arguments why their county capital-city should host the 
central office of the Regional Development Agency in the region. Their 
publically expressed arguments are analysed below, with an emphasis on the 
conflicting logic of alternative geographies put forward. 
When the development regions were created back in 1997, they were 
designed to engulf cultural areas, defined as special regional units, regrouping 
of counties with similar socio-cultural profile, including social capital46. A 
cultural area is defined by composing counties characteristics, namely rural 
development, urban development, share of orthodox religion believers, share of 
arable land, and belonging to a given historical region. By aggregating those 
variables, Sandu notices that counties tend to be similar by economic and 
                                                 
46
  D. Sandu. “Ariile culturale ale României”, Sociologie Românească, vol. 1, nos. 3-4, 1990, 
pp. 295-306. 
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cultural profiles47. The cluster analysis run by Sandu by grouping counties 
underlined a number of core areas, with large probability of prediction, as well 
as less structured cultural areas. For the first cases, the structural ties are so 
strong, that they cannot be easily unnoticed. Those core areas are TR-GR-IL-
CL, BT-VS, CV-HR, BV-SB, SJ-BN. Therefore, those core cultural areas have 
been used as nucleus for regrouping counties into development regions, whereas 
less structured cultural areas have been sometimes divided and regrouped into 
different development regions. The less structured cultural areas identified by 
Sandu are GL-IS, DJ-OT-MH, AB-HD, CJ-MS, MM-SM, AR-BH, TM-CS. 
The regrouping of counties proposed in 1997 by Hansen maintained the core 
areas and distributed counties from less structured cultural areas as to get 
balanced development regions in terms of population and economic 
development48. The subsequent laws on regional development (Law 151/1998 
and Law 315/2004) maintained the regrouping proposed by the initial study on 
the profiles of the Romanian regions49. 
 
Table 2 
Cross-cutting Between Cultural Areas and Development Regions in 1997 
                                                 
47
  Idem, Spațiul social al tranziției, Polirom, Iași, 1999, p. 146. 
48
  Idem, “Social Disparities in the Regional Development and Policies of Romania”, 
International Review of Social Research, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1-30. 
49
  Romanian Government, European Commission, Carta verde. Politica de dezvoltare 
regională în România, Phare Programme, București, 1997. 
Regions Cultural areas regrouped into development regions 
A Cultural areas totally engulfed by development regions 
Region 1, North-East Botoşani (BT) - Vaslui (VS) 
Region 2, South-East Brăila (BR) - Buzău (BZ), Constanţa (CT) - Tulcea (TL) 
Region 3, South Argeş (AG) - Dâmboviţa (DB) - Prahova (PH), Teleorman (TR) - 
Giurgiu (GR) - Călăraşi (CL) - Ialomiţa (IL) 
Region 4, South-West Dolj (DJ) - Mehedinţi (MH) - Olt (OT), Vâlcea (VL) - Gorj (GJ) 
Region 5, West Caraş-Severin (CS) - Timiş (TM) 
Region 6, North-West Bistriţa-Năsăud (BN) - Sălaj (SJ), Maramureş (MM) - Satu-Mare 
(SM) 
Region 7, Center Braşov (BV) - Sibiu (SB), Covasna (CV) - Harghita (HR)  
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The new debate on regionalization had a fresh new start in November 2012, 
following the general elections, and was the first open public debate on the 
matter. The previous step in regionalization was made with no public 
discussion, as a pure governmental issue. The debate offered the chance for 
many actors to put forward their claims and to challenge the central 
government, who was still in favour of keeping the eight development regions, 
but endowing them with serious competences, following a dully constitutional 
amendment, scheduled for 2013. This was the initial statement of Prime-
minister Victor Ponta (president of the Social Democrat Party ‒ PSD), and head 
of the winning opposition coalition formed by the Social Democrats and the 
National Liberal Party (PNL). Despite the fact that the ruling coalition between 
PSD and PNL dismantled in 2013 and thus disabled a constitutional revision in 
2013 and a consistent regionalization in 2014, the incipient debate is instructive 
for the arguments put forward by actors. 
 
 
The Governance and Regulation Model:  
A Framework for Analysis 
 
The analysis of the arguments used by the actors is made through a 
framework that encompasses two distinctive and interactive processes, namely 
governance and regulation. The model is taken from Vasken50 and from 
                                                 
50
  P. Vaesken, “Régulation/Gouvernance en économie sociale et solidaire: un modèle pour 
comprendre l’innovation sociale territoriale”, paper presented at the Conference 
“Politiques publiques, administration de proximité et cohésion sociale”, University 
Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco, 7-8 May 2010. 
Region 8, Bucharest-
Ilfov 
Bucharest (B) - Ilfov (IF) 
B Cultural areas split between development regions 
Region 1 and Region 2 Vrancea (VN) - Bacău (BC) - Neamț (NT) - Suceava (SV) 
Region 1 and Region 2 Iași (IS) - Galați (GL) 
Region 5 and Region 7 Hunedoara (HD) - Alba (AB) 
Region 5 and Region 6 Arad (AR) - Bihor (BH) 
Region 6 and Region 7 Cluj (CJ) - Mureş (MS) 
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Zafiropoulou and Vaesken51 and was build in order to understand complex 
processes occurring from the interaction between structures and agents on a 
given territory. The model takes into account the situation of a territory as the 
result of the situation of actors on both dimensions, namely governance and 
regulation. Relevant actors on the field may be understood as entrenched in a 
context ranging from a local or an emerging regulation to a highly centralized 
regulation, on one hand, and from an emerging governance to a highly situated 
governance, on the other hand. The model looks at how actors favour a top-
down or a bottom-up approach when they territorially interact when engaged in 
collective action, and at how social norms are generated, negotiated and finally 
accepted by those actors. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. General Governance-Regulation/MLP/SPT Model52 
 
The model has been successfully tested for social issues and since then 
improved by Vaesken with the help of a new approach53, taken from other two 
                                                 
51
  M. Zafiropoulou, P. Vaesken, “Gestionarea politicilor sociale. Un model de guvernare și 
reglementare”, in D. Dragoman, D.A. Popescu, (eds.), Gestiunea politicilor publice 
teritoriale și integrare europeană, LBUS Press, Sibiu, 2010, pp. 30-50. 
52
  The figure was drawn by P. Vaesken. See also P. Vaesken, “Régulation et gouvernance 
dans le champ de l’évaluation des politiques publiques, contribution du programme 
européen VALUES”, paper presented at the Conference “Évaluation des Politiques 
Publiques. Modalités de Construction, d’Accompagnement et de Suivi”, Rabat, Morocco, 
24-25 November 2014. 
53
  P. Vaesken, “Régulation et gouvernance…cit.”. 
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models, the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP)54 and Social Practice Theory (SPT)55. 
MLP was favoured because it takes into account transitions, defined as regime 
shifts, which come about through interactive processes within and between different 
levels. Those levels are niches (locus for radical innovations), socio-technical 
regimes and an exogenous socio-technical landscape. They are all involved in 
transitions, which are not easy processes, mainly because existing regimes are 
largely defined by lock-in and path dependence56. Therefore, according to Geels, 
innovation could influence over regimes only when external landscape 
developments create pressure on the regimes and provide windows of opportunity. 
This is extremely important for the analysis of the recent regionalization attempts, 
which ended in failure when such a window of opportunity was suddenly closed. 
With SPT, the model focuses on a theory of action or on practice theories, in 
fact cultural theories that favour agents embedded in the social field, theories 
oriented towards human action and social order. As put by Reckwitz, those theories 
explain and understand actions by reconstructing the symbolic structures of 
knowledge which enable and constrain agents to interpret the world according to 
certain forms, and to behave in corresponding ways57. Therefore, social order is 
embedded in collective cognitive and symbolic structures, a “shared knowledge” 
that generates a common way of understanding the social field, its structures and 
agents58. By combining the two perspectives, the general model allows us to make 
essential distinctions between strategies of actors, with a top-down approach that 
would rather favour a normative or legislative institutionalization, in conflict with a 
bottom-up approach that would rather favour a cultural institutionalization, based 
on local initiatives which are negotiated by actors in the framework of emerging 
regulation and governance59. 
 
 
The Conflict of Interpretations:  
Local Actors and Regional Design 
 
The analysis of actors’ strategies of negotiation, while pursing the defence 
of local identities and interests, is made by a general survey of political 
positions expressed by parties or their elected officials, by officials from 
                                                 
54
  F.W. Geels, “Ontologies, Socio-Technical Transitions (to Sustainability), and Multi-Level 
Perspective”, Research Policy, vol. 39, no. 4, 2010, pp. 495-510. 
55
 A. Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices. A Development in Culturalist 
Theorizing”, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 5, no. 2, 2002, pp. 243-263. 
56
  F.W. Geels, “Ontologies, Socio-Technical Transitions…cit.”, p. 495. 
57
  A. Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices…cit.”, p. 245. 
58
  Ibidem, p. 246. 
59
  P. Vaesken, “Régulation et gouvernance dans le champ de l’évaluation des politiques 
publiques…cit.”. 
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regional level (especially county-councillors) and by officials from the national 
level (ministers in government and top politicians, members of Parliament, from 
both ruling coalition and the opposition). The arguments are grouped according 
to the spatial distribution on a local – central scale, making the difference 
between the types of institutionalization involved and their top-down or bottom-
up approach. We therefore make a distinction between central actors, as the 
central government and the central structures of parties from both governing 
coalition and the opposition, and more local actors, as local structures of parties 
and elected officials from regional and local administration. 
With the initial proposal of prime-minister Ponta of keeping in place the 
existing development regions yet empowering them with serious competences 
and the apparent willingness of the government to seriously decentralize60, one 
can witness in late 2012 and early 2013 a large share of local actors getting 
involved in a completely new process of normative negotiating the territorial 
design and the nature of territorial development policies. The government 
adopted in February 2013 a Memorandum for further regionalization and put in 
place expert working teams and even organized several debates with local 
elected officials from the current development regions61. The expert working 
team, the Consultative Council for Regionalization (CONREG), issued a report 
on the development disparities to be taken into account when setting up the 
principles of regionalization62. The coordinator of the report, Dumitru Sandu, 
emphasized the constraints related to tackling the development gaps not only 
between counties and historical provinces, but between urban and rural 
Romania. Taking into account several models (large, historical provinces 
engulfing several development regions; current development regions; 16 micro-
regions or more, made by regrouping two or three existing counties), the report 
concluded with the relative advantages of the current grouping of counties in the 
existing development regions. Thus the eight development regions set up back 
in 1998 still maintain their net advantage of cultural homogeneity, functional 
configuration when it comes to assess the internal migration, economic 
competitiveness and demographic size. The proposed solution for 
regionalization is keeping the current development regions with their shape and 
county composition, with the possible merger of the region South with region 
                                                 
60
  F. Mincu, “Ponta: Regionalizarea României se va face în 2013 sau deloc”, Gazeta de 
Botoșani, 23 December 2012, available at http://www.gazetabt.ro/politica-ponta-
regionalizarea-romaniei-se-va-face-in-2013-sau-deloc.html, accessed 12 July 2016. 
61
  Ziua de Cluj, “Guvernul a dat liber la regionalizare”, 19 February 2013, available at 
http://ziuadecj.realitatea.net/politica/guvernul-a-dat-liber-la-regionalizare--106764.html, 
accessed 12 July 2016. 
62
  D. Sandu, “Disparități și fluxuri în fundamentarea social-economică a regionalizării 
administrative a României”, available at http://regionalizare.mdrap.ro/2013/04/ 21/ 
disparitati-si-fluxuri-in-fundamentarea-social-economica-a-regionalizarii-administrative-
a-romaniei/, accessed 09 October 2016. 
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Bucharest-Ilfov. This last move would be recommended for a balanced 
development of both regions, since Bucharest, as Romania's capital-city, 
attracted human resources from all the neighbouring counties, without a proper 
budget equilibration through regional redistribution. The conclusions of the 
report were the starting base of the debate initiated by the government. 
This governmental openness was totally different from the earlier steps 
made by the central government a decade ago. The possibility of large regional 
autonomy for large territorial units, as the former historical regions, made a 
former prime-minister to label it as an idea launched by minds gone off the 
rails, making Romanians lock themselves up in their own provinces63. The 
benevolent attitude of the central government in 2012 encouraged actors to 
generate spaces of dialogue, where norms and negotiated results could be 
validated. 
The position expressed by the PSD-PNL governing coalition, under the 
banner of the victorious Social-Liberal Union (USL) in the 2012 general 
elections, was not significantly different from that officially expressed by the 
former governing coalition formed by the Liberal-Democrat Party (PDL) and 
the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) between 2009 and 
2011. The former attempt of redesigning regional administration failed in 2011 
due to a serious divergence of opinions between PDL and UDMR regarding the 
autonomy of counties inhabited in large shares by ethnic Hungarians in 
Transylvania64. The existence of counties inhabited by ethnic Hungarians in 
Transylvania is most often a relevant electoral and political factor in Romanian 
politics65. Due to the difficult negotiation within the governing coalition, 
UDMR put forward its own proposal for regional design. The project multiplies 
the current eight development regions by two, proposing 16 regions by 
changing the composition of them, but without crossing the historical borders 
between former historical regions. Most noticeably, it regroups the counties 
inhabited by ethnic Hungarians (CV-HR-MS) into one region, in the heart of 
Transylvania, and the counties less inhabited by ethnic Hungarians (the internal 
ethnic Hungarian diaspora) into distinct regions (BH-SJ-SM and CJ-BN-MM). 
Moreover, UDMR proposed that five macro-regions would engulf the 16 
regions, with less care about the former historical borders. New regions 4, 5, 6 
and 7 would form the macro-region I, regions 1, 2, and 3 the macro-region II, 
regions 8, 9 and 10 the macro-region III, regions 11, 12 and 13 the macro-
                                                 
63
  A.M. Dobre, “The Dynamics of Partisan Adaptation to Europeanization…cit.”. 
64
  D. Dragoman, B. Gheorghiță, “Regional Design, Local Autonomy and Ethnic 
Struggle…cit.”. 
65
  A. Zamfira, D. Dragoman, “Le vote (non)ethnique en Roumanie, 2000-2008. Les performances 
électorales des partis des minorités allemande et hongroise en perspective compareé”, 
Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 40, no. 2, 2009, pp. 127-156; A. Zamfira, 
“Methodological Limitations…cit.”. 
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region IV. Finally, all the counties from regions where ethnic Hungarians leave 
in significant shares would be part of macro-region V, which would regroup the 
Hungarian core and diaspora counties from newly designed regions 14, 15 and 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Regional Design Proposed by UDMR66 
 
Focusing most prominently on that special region, UDMR is less a central 
actor and more a local actor, emphasizing the logic of bottom-up pressure on the 
existing regime and trying to maximize the window of opportunity. With its 
project rejected by the partner coalition in 201167, UDMR refused to make the 
necessary steps towards an agreement and the whole regionalization process 
was postponed68. When the debate was reopened in late 2012, this bold proposal 
made by UDMR was an incentive for many local actors to put forward their 
own proposals. We make a special emphasis here on this proposal as a clear 
example of initiative aimed at combining top-down strategies (as part of the 
                                                 
66
  Map available at https://transildania.wordpress.com/2011/05/26/regionalizarea-3-delimitarea- 
regiunilor/, accessed 12 July 2016. 
67
  D. Bochsler, E. Szöcsik, “The Forbidden Fruit of Federalism: Evidence from Romania 
and Slovakia”, West European Politics, vol. 36, no. 2, 2013, pp. 426-446. 
68
  D. Dragoman, B. Gheorghiță, “Regional Design, Local Autonomy and Ethnic 
Struggle…cit.”. 
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governing coalition) and bottom-up initiatives (as key local player in one 
distinctive region), namely an effort for converting a cultural institutionalization 
into a binding legislative institutionalization, as predicted by the MLP model. 
The bottom-up initiative of UDMR is to be seen in the November 2013 
decision to organize a referendum, set up by the Harghita county council 
dominated by UDMR councillors, in order to have a citizen consultation 
regarding the future design of a new development region, made up by the 
current Harghita, Covasna and Mureș counties69. With its capital city at Târgu-
Mureș (the capital-city of the current Mureș county), the proposed region would 
thus separate from the powerful influence of heavily industrialized Brașov 
neighbouring county. Any other association between Brașov and less developed 
counties as Covasna and Harghita would lead to increasing underdevelopment 
of the latter, with serious competitive advantages of the former70. The UDMR 
proposal for organizing a referendum has been signed by no less than 40,000 
people from the three counties, according to the president of Harghita county, 
Borbely Csaba, yet it was assumed only by Harghita county council, while 
Mureș county council rejected the proposal. The different outcome of the 
initiative in Mureș and Harghita expresses different regionalization strategies of 
UDMR and PSD-PNL governing coalition (more powerful among county 
councillors in Mureș than in Harghita), as well as ethnic strategies, since all the 
Hungarian parties represented in Harghita county council, not only UDMR, 
backed up the initiative. 
With the firm proposal made by UDMR, many local and regional actors found 
the opportunity to speak out in defence of their own identity and interests. The most 
active local actors were those interested in negotiating favourable regrouping of 
counties as to avoid subordinate administrative positions. As UDMR has tried to 
avoid diluting the ethnic composition and the electoral support from core counties 
by the least possible mixing with counties largely inhabited by ethnic Romanians 
(BV, SB, AB or CJ, BN, MM), local actors from many cultural areas tried to assure 
primacy in two distinct ways. On the one hand, some of those actors (local branches 
of national parties, local elected officials) tended to split from their fellow pair 
county from the cultural area and to look for a solid arrangement which distributes 
each county into a different region. This was the case of PNL Bihor71, who 
reshaped existing development regions (as shown in Figure 1) by carefully isolating 
                                                 
69
  J. Benedek, H. Bajtalan, “Recent Regionalization Discourses and Projects in Romania 
with Special Focus on Szekelyland”, Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 
no. 44, 2015, pp. 23-41. 
70
  I. Tudor, “Consiliul Județean Harghita a aprobat organizarea referendumului pe tema 
regionalizării”, romaniatv.net, 27 November 2013, available at http://www.romaniatv. 
net/consiliul-judetean-harghita-a-aprobat-organizarea-referendumului-pe-tema-regionalizarii_ 
111377.html, accessed 09 October 2016. 
71
  România Liberă, “Politicienii din Bihor susţin în comun o variantă de regionalizare în 
care Oradea să fie centrul”, 31 January 2013, available at http://www.romanialibera.ro/ 
politica/institutii/politicienii-din-bihor-sustin-in-comun-o-varianta-de-regionalizare-in-
care-oradea-sa-fie-centrul-292078, accessed 12 July 2016. 
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their own county (BH) from the influence of their rivals, Arad county (its pair from 
the cultural area BH-AR) and Cluj county. This is an industrialized and highly 
educated and economically competitive neighbouring county, which overshadows 
Bihor county in the current composition of Development Region 5 North-West. 
The same conflict is to be noticed in other regions. The opposition between the 
county elected officials from Sibiu and Brașov made the governing party PSD to 
propose the reshaping of the current Development Region V (Center) and the 
formation of a new region (SB-AB-HD), leaving Brașov county in the territorial 
limits of another region (BV-MS-HR-CV)72. This is a clear success of local actors’ 
strategy to overrule a centralized regulation by an emerging regulation, issued on 
local grounds and often with the support of a local coalition made by elected officials 
from various parties, as indicated in the Figure 2 with respect to the SPT model. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Regional Design Proposed by PSD in 201373 
On the other hand, when it proved impossible to split from fellow counties 
                                                 
72
  L. Pârvu, “Harta regionalizării în varianta PSD”, HotNews.ro, 30 August 2013, available 
at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-15475279-victor-ponta-anuntat-regionalizarea-face-
prin-proiect-lege-trebuie-formam-regiunile-inainte-primi-statutul-constitutional.htm, 
accessed 12 July 2016. 
73
  Map available at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-15475279-victor-ponta-anuntat-
regionalizarea-face-prin-proiect-lege-trebuie-formam-regiunile-inainte-primi-statutul-
constitutional.htm, accessed 13 July 2016. 
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from the same cultural areas, the strategy moved from the shaping of the region 
to the designation of the future capital-city. In the same move to appease local 
elected officials from the current Development Region 3 (South), the same 
Social-Democrat party favoured Ploiești (PH) instead of Pitești (AG). 
Entrenched in an offensive against competing regional maps and against the 
interest of neighbouring counties, even they were headed by fellow PSD party 
leaders, the president of the Prahova (PH) county-council, Mircea Cosma, 
issued his own proposal. This proposal favoured 12 regions and Bucharest, 
Romania’s capital-city, instead of the current eight development regions, with 
Ploiești, the current capital-city of his own county as one of those future 
regions74. He was expected that the regions be first reshaped, and then endowed 
with real powers and financial autonomy, following the required constitutional 
amendment. In the same time, the Social-Democrat party favoured Focșani 
(VN) instead of Brăila (BR), for the future capital-city of a newly shaped region 
(VN-BZ-GL-BR)75. Noticing the very complicated process of negotiating 
diverging regional geographies76, which could prove an endless task, the prime-
minister Ponta declared during a party meeting that this would be the last 
concession of the central government to party local elected officials77. 
Before that, a PSD senator proposed to the party another project. Back in 
2011, Mugurel Surupăceanu proposed that newly designed regions to engulf 
current counties regardless of the most important constraint until then, namely 
their belonging to distinct historical provinces, with different ethnic background 
and different past experiences. The project was merely a response to the 
governmental intention to boost regionalization by transforming development 
regions into fully functional regions. According to Surupăceanu, the governing 
coalition PDL-UDMR was looking at concentrating power by dissolving the 
existing counties and replacing them with a limited number of larger regions, 
yet maintaining the current regional development gap78. The most important 
                                                 
74
  Committee of the Regions, news, “Mircea Cosma: ar trebui ca România să fie împărțită în 
minimum 12 regiuni, plus capitala,” 03 September 2013, available at http://www.cor.europa.eu/ 
ro/news/regional/Pages/mircea-cosma-trebui-romania-sa-fie-impartita-minimum-12-regiuni 
capitala.aspx?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_ campaign=Romania-
September-2013, accessed 09 October 2016. 
75
  Realitatea.net, “Harta regionalizării în varianta PSD: Cum va fi redesenată 
România”, 31 August 2013, available at http://www.realitatea.net/harta-regionalizarii-in-
varianta-psd-cum-va-fi-redesenata-romania_1259804.html, accessed 12 July 2016. 
76
  A. Ghinea, “Ponta nu este de acord cu împărțirea României în opt regiuni”, Ziare.com, 16 
August 2013, available at http://www.ziare.com/victor-ponta/premier/ponta-nu-este-de-
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criterion to be taken into account would thus be GDP in the region. The 
regrouping of counties would aim at splitting and recomposing the existing 
development regions as to get the most balanced regional development model. 
Moreover, by splitting the current development region Center and regrouping 
the counties largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarians alongside counties largely 
inhabited by ethnic Romanians, the proposed design would have diluted 
Szeklerland, a secondary aimed assumed by the author of the proposal. Despite 
the emphasis on balanced regional development, the project's bold design for 
regrouping counties regardless of their past history turned it into a pure personal 
proposal, with no further party backup. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Regional Design Proposed by Surupăceanu to USL in 201179 
 
Probably the most relevant strategy for defending local identity and 
interests is to be noticed in the case of Sibiu, where the city mayor entered a 
political national career that would finally turn him into the president of 
Romania. Head of a cultural organization of ethnic Germans called the 
Democrat Forum of Germans in Romania (FDGR), Klaus Johannis won four 
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times on a row the mayoral elections in Sibiu80. Those electoral victories made 
Sibiu a distinct political space, a special case in ethnic cooperation in 
Romania81, and a declaration of Europeanization in a region still marked by 
ethnic tensions82. Despite a brief episode when he was proposed as prime-
minister candidate in 2009 by a PSD-PNL parliamentary coalition but was not 
appointed by the Romanian president83, Johannis was a rather local figure. Praised 
for his abilities and competence in turning a medium-size town in southern 
Transylvania into a European Capital of Culture in 2007 and a hotspot for 
tourism and foreign investment during his mayoral mandates84, he was still the 
president of an ethnic cultural association which was politically competing locally85. 
The debate opened in 2012 regarding the new regional design found him as 
the mayor of Sibiu, facing the threat of being politically subordinated to a 
supplementary administrative layer, the newly designed region, whose 
composition and capital-city were negotiated by central and local actors within 
the governing coalition PSD-PNL, with a high risk of designating Brașov as the 
future regional capital-city. The opportunity he seized in 2013 was to leave the 
direction of the city and of FDGR in good hands and to climb very fast in the 
hierarchy of PNL, as vice-president of the party and head of the regionalization 
commission within the Liberal party. As coalition partner, he was claiming the 
direction of the Interior ministry and the position of vice-prime-minister. By 
this, he would have been in a much better position when the new regional 
design would have been finally decided. The refusal of his fellow coalition 
party (PSD) to appoint Johannis as interior minister and vice-prime-minister 
finally led to a coalition breakdown in 2013 and an astonishing victory for 
Klaus Johannis, as PNL president, to the presidential elections in November 
2014. Although regionalization was postponed due to coalition bargaining 
permanent failures86 and the overruling by the Constitutional Court of Romania 
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in January 2014 of a law regarding some decentralization measures87, the 
strategy used by a local actor for securing a better position and use a window of 
opportunity, opened by the willingness of the central government to publically 
discuss the regionalization issue, in order to get the best outcomes from a 
regulation process is instructive for the model put forward in this paper. The 
decision took in August 2013 by PSD, the coalition partner of PNL, to move 
from a regionalization with eight regions to a regionalization with ten regions, 
including an additional separate Sibiu region, could be partially seen as a 
success strategy of this strong local actor to influence on an overall highly 
centralized regulation system in Romania88. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The current regionalization projects and debates in Romania, although a 
very slow process, could be seen a case-study for regionalization attempts in a 
highly centralized state and for the way a central government faces competing 
regional geographies. Adopting the French type of national state, Romania tried 
for almost a century to culturally homogenize and to politically unify the 
national territory. The European integration, not by his institutional pressure, 
but by the development opportunities provided by structural development funds, 
could influence the current situation and provide incentive for local actors and 
for social innovation, as acknowledged by the Multi-Level Perspective Theory. 
Actors embedded in local settings may use the new situation and try to impose 
innovation fostered in a specific niche to the central regime level. By doing so, 
actors get entrenched in profound processes of negotiation of norms and 
behaviours, expressing tensions between local and centralized regulation and 
governance, as agents working for a common understanding of the social field, 
as acknowledged by the Social Practice Theory. 
The general model combining the governance and regulation model with 
two other theories (MLP and SPT) was an effort to unravel the overall pattern of 
interaction between political and social actors in the complex process of 
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regionalization. The Romanian case is instructive for the way regionalization 
could occur in a centralized state when the central government, as key factor, is 
willing to foster a genuine process of decentralization, or when the European 
conditionality may force him to do so. The conflicts between local actors 
regarding various regional design options, underlining deep relations of power 
and influence, made the central government reluctant during the regionalization 
process. The governmental initiative from 2012 is to be taken however as a step 
forward towards a complete redesigning of regional administration and the 
empowerment of local actors, in the logic of a sustainable and responsible 
regional autonomy in Romania. 
The regionalization issue will be once again on the agenda, following the 
late autumn general elections in 201689. Since very little has been changed in 
the overall political system balance (with PSD as potential governing party and 
Klaus Johannis as Romanian president in office), scholarly research will have to 
pay attention to the complex set of factors that previously undermined 
regionalization. On the one hand, the increasing regional disparities will force 
the central government to look for the most suitable mechanisms for regional 
development balance and equity. On the other hand, ethnic and identity issues, 
especially with respect to a future autonomous region in Transylvania, inhabited 
by large shares of ethnic Hungarians, will represent a challenge to the 
Romanian national and centralized state, which will celebrate its centenary in 
2018. With the additional pressure from more structural factors as the proper 
spending of the EU cohesion funds, successful regionalization will be a 
milestone in Romanian politics. 
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